Renewable Energy Power’s Investment and Production Strategy for Cost-sharing Centralized Noncooperative Game Model of Power Sales with Power Grid’s Risk Avoidance

This paper develops a cost-sharing centralized non-cooperative game model of power sales with power grid’s risk avoidance. Through the application of the nonlinear programming theorem and the complete information static game, the paper explores the investment and production strategy of renewable energy power for the model, accounting for the renewable energy power production quotas and the green power certificate system. The investigation identifies a unique optimal strategy for renewable energy power investment and production within the model. This conclusion is substantiated through the implementation of the gradient-like optimization method. Furthermore, the research analyzes the impact of the power grid’s risk-avoidance coefficient on players’ decision-making regarding benefits. The findings indicate when the power grid focuses on risk avoidance, to satisfy its own risk avoidance needs, it would improve its own the optimal power price. Consequently, the energy suppliers would witness an augmentation in their profit margins. They would seize this opportunity to increase power production quantities from their individual standpoint. The measure taken by them is investing more in renewable energy technologies to enhance the optimal renewable energy utilization rates.