Group strategy-proof rules in multidimensional binary domains

Aditya Aradhye,Hans Peters

Social Choice and Welfare(2024)

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摘要
We consider a setting in which the alternatives are binary vectors and the preferences of the agents are determined by the Hamming distance from their most preferred alternatives. We consider only rules that are unanimous, anonymous, and component-neutral, and focus on strategy-proofness, weak group strategy-proofness, and strong group strategy-proofness. We show that component-wise majority rules are strategy-proof, and for three agents or two components also weakly group strategy-proof, but not otherwise. These rules are even strongly group strategy-proof if there are two or three agents. Our main result is an impossibility result: if there are at least four agents and at least three components, then no rule is strongly group strategy-proof.
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