Optimal Stopping with Interdependent Values
arxiv(2024)
摘要
We study online selection problems in both the prophet and secretary
settings, when arriving agents have interdependent values. In the
interdependent values model, introduced in the seminal work of Milgrom and
Weber [1982], each agent has a private signal and the value of an agent is a
function of the signals held by all agents. Results in online selection
crucially rely on some degree of independence of values, which is conceptually
at odds with the interdependent values model. For prophet and secretary models
under the standard independent values assumption, prior works provide constant
factor approximations to the welfare. On the other hand, when agents have
interdependent values, prior works in Economics and Computer Science provide
truthful mechanisms that obtain optimal and approximately optimal welfare under
certain assumptions on the valuation functions.
We bring together these two important lines of work and provide the first
constant factor approximations for prophet and secretary problems with
interdependent values. We consider both the algorithmic setting, where agents
are non-strategic (but have interdependent values), and the mechanism design
setting with strategic agents. All our results are constructive and use simple
stopping rules.
更多查看译文
AI 理解论文
溯源树
样例
生成溯源树,研究论文发展脉络
Chat Paper
正在生成论文摘要