Genomic Surveillance of a Canadian Airport Wastewater Samples Allows Early Detection of Emerging SARS-CoV-2 Lineages

Alyssa K. Overton, Jennifer J. Knapp,Opeyemi U. Lawal,Richard Gibson, Anastasia A. Fedynak, Adebowale I. Adebiyi, Brittany Maxwell, Lydia Cheng, Carina Bee, Asim Qasim, Kyle Atanas,Mark Payne,Rebecca Stuart,Manon D. Fleury,Natalie C. Knox,Delaney Nash, Yemurayi C. Hungwe, Samran R. Prasla, Hannifer Ho, Simininuoluwa O. Agboola, Su-Hyun Kwon,Shiv Naik,Valeria R. Parreira, Fozia Rizvi, Melinda J. Precious, Steven Thomas, Marcos Zambrano, Vixey Fang, Elaine Gilliand, Monali Varai, Maureen Horn,Chrystal Landgraff,Eric J. Arts,Lawrence Goodridge,Trevor C. Charles

crossref(2024)

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摘要
Abstract The SARS-CoV-2 pandemic has shown that wastewater (WW) surveillance is an effective means of tracking the emergence of viral lineages in communities, arriving by many routes including via transportation hubs. In Ontario, numerous municipal WWTPs participate in WW surveillance of infectious disease targets such as SARS-CoV-2 by qPCR and whole genome sequencing (WGS). The Greater Toronto Airports Authority (GTAA), operator of Toronto Pearson International Airport (Toronto Pearson), has been participating in WW surveillance since January 2022. As a major international airport in Canada and the largest national hub, this airport is an ideal location for tracking globally emerging SARS-CoV-2 variants of concern (VOCs). In this study, WW collected from Toronto Pearson’s two terminals and pooled aircraft sewage was processed for WGS using a tiled-amplicon approach targeting the SARS-CoV-2 virus. Data generated was analyzed to monitor trends SARS-CoV-2 lineage frequencies. Initial detections of emerging lineages were compared between Toronto Pearson WW samples, municipal WW samples collected from the surrounding regions, and Ontario clinical data as published by Public Health Ontario. Results enabled the early detection of VOCs and individual mutations emerging in Ontario. On average, emergence of novel lineages at the airport ahead of clinical detections was 1–4 weeks, and up to 16 weeks. This project illustrates the efficacy of WW surveillance at transitory transportation hubs and sets an example that could be applied to other viruses as part of a pandemic preparedness strategy and to provide monitoring on a mass scale.
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