Strategic guidance of carbon emission reduction in industrial parks based on dynamic evolution game

To achieve the carbon neutrality goal, the industrial parks with heavy multi-energy consumption are gradually promoting green and low-carbon transitions. This transition is a long-term dynamic evolution process, which is affected by the strategies of different stakeholders and unpredictable events. It will lead to the industrial parks blindly promoting carbon emission reduction tasks. Therefore, it is necessary to analyze the stakeholders' strategy evolution trajectories based on the evolutionary game theory under changing scenarios to provide correct policy guidance for their carbon emission reduction process. In this paper, firstly, an evolutionary game model of carbon emission reduction in industrial parks is constructed, including an energy supplier, an industrial park operator, and the government. Secondly, the dynamic behavior characteristics of different stakeholders and the factors affecting the stability of the strategy equilibrium are analyzed thoroughly. Finally, different scenarios are formulated to simulate and analyze industrial parks’ long-term dynamic evolutionary game law of carbon emission reduction. Furthermore, discussions and suggestions are provided to guide industrial parks’ future carbon emission reduction transitions.