Asymmetric Centrality Game Against Network Epidemic Propagation

The Mirai botnet network epidemic discovered in 2016 falls into the category of numerous epidemics propagated by attackers over a network to gain control over multiple devices. This particular epidemic has been employed in some of the most extensive and widespread distributed denial of service (DDoS) attacks [24]. To take control of numerous devices, the attacker's strategy consists of injecting malicious code from an infected device into one or more vulnerable neighboring devices. This initiates a conflict, as the defender attempts to restrict the attacker's influence and control. Intelligent and rational agents (defender and attacker) thus engage in a conflictual interaction, constantly competing for optimal strategies within the network. Their objective is to gain control over the most crucial devices, which are identified using centrality measures. Nevertheless, an agent's perception of the significance of devices may vary due to factors such as variations in roles, information accessibility, available resources, and diverse viewpoints on risks, issues, or opportunities [8]. Consequently, the agents involved in the process may hold different views regarding the significance of devices, resulting in the utilization of different centrality measures. The significance of considering these variations in centrality measures, as well as the impact on each agent's objective, is emphasized by our analysis. Hence, we propose a non-zero-sum game model to identify the optimal centrality measure for each agent in the context of controlling an epidemic spread. Our model also provides the NE (Nash Equilibrium) strategy profile for agents at each stage of the game. Numerical experiments show that, by taking into account these differences in centrality measures and using our game model, defenders effectively limit the impact of epidemics caused by malicious attackers.