Rejoinder to "Perspectives on `harm' in personalized medicine – an alternative perspective"
arxiv(2024)
摘要
In our original article (Sarvet Stensrud, 2024), we examine twin
definitions of "harm" in personalized medicine: one based on predictions of
individuals' unmeasurable response types (counterfactual harm), and another
based solely on the observations of experiments (interventionist harm). In
their commentary, Mueller Pearl (2024) (MP) read our review as an argument
that "counterfactual logic should [...] be purged from consideration of harm
and benefit" and "strongly object [...] that a rational decision maker may well
apply the interventional perspective to the exclusion of counterfactual
considerations." Here we show that this objection is misguided. We analyze MP's
examples and derive a general result, showing that determinations of harm
through interventionist and counterfactual analyses will always concur.
Therefore, individuals who embrace counterfactual formulations and those who
object to their use will make equivalent decisions in uncontroversial settings.
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