A Monolithic Cybersecurity Architecture for Power Electronic Systems
IEEE Transactions on Smart Grid(2024)
摘要
Power electronic systems (PES) face significant threats from various data
availability and integrity attacks, significantly affecting the performance of
communication networks and power system operation. As a result, several attack
detection and reconstruction techniques are deployed, which makes it a costly
& complex cybersecurity operational platform with significant room for
incremental extensions for mitigation against future threats. Unlike the said
traditional arrangements, our paper introduces a foundational approach by
establishing a monolithic cybersecurity architecture (MCA) via incorporating
semantic principles into the sampling process for distributed energy resources
(DERs). This unified approach concurrently compensates for the intrusion
challenges posed by cyber attacks by reconstructing signals using the dynamics
of the inner control layer. This reconstruction considers essential semantic
attributes, like Priority, Freshness, and Relevance to ensure resilient dynamic
performance. Hence, the proposed scheme promises a generalized route to
concurrently tackle a global set of cyber attacks in elevating the resilience
of PES. Finally, rigorous validation on a modified IEEE 69-bus distribution
system and a real-world South California Edison (SCE) 47-bus network, using
OPAL-RT under diverse operating conditions, underscores its robustness,
model-free design capability, scalability, and adaptability to dynamic cyber
graphs and system reconfiguration.
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关键词
Data dropout,distributed control,false-data injection attacks (FDIAs),inner control loop dynamics,latency attack,power electronic systems (PES),semantic sampling,time synchronization attack (TSA)
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