A Monolithic Cybersecurity Architecture for Power Electronic Systems

IEEE Transactions on Smart Grid(2024)

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摘要
Power electronic systems (PES) face significant threats from various data availability and integrity attacks, significantly affecting the performance of communication networks and power system operation. As a result, several attack detection and reconstruction techniques are deployed, which makes it a costly & complex cybersecurity operational platform with significant room for incremental extensions for mitigation against future threats. Unlike the said traditional arrangements, our paper introduces a foundational approach by establishing a monolithic cybersecurity architecture (MCA) via incorporating semantic principles into the sampling process for distributed energy resources (DERs). This unified approach concurrently compensates for the intrusion challenges posed by cyber attacks by reconstructing signals using the dynamics of the inner control layer. This reconstruction considers essential semantic attributes, like Priority, Freshness, and Relevance to ensure resilient dynamic performance. Hence, the proposed scheme promises a generalized route to concurrently tackle a global set of cyber attacks in elevating the resilience of PES. Finally, rigorous validation on a modified IEEE 69-bus distribution system and a real-world South California Edison (SCE) 47-bus network, using OPAL-RT under diverse operating conditions, underscores its robustness, model-free design capability, scalability, and adaptability to dynamic cyber graphs and system reconfiguration.
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关键词
Data dropout,distributed control,false-data injection attacks (FDIAs),inner control loop dynamics,latency attack,power electronic systems (PES),semantic sampling,time synchronization attack (TSA)
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