A game theoretic approach to lowering incentives to violate speed limits in Finland
arxiv(2024)
摘要
We expand on earlier research on the topic by discussing an infinitely
repeated game model with a subgame perfect equilibrium strategy profile (SPE)
as a solution concept that diminishes incentives to violate speed limits in a
carrot and stick fashion. In attempts to construct an SPE strategy profile, the
initial state is chosen such that the drivers are playing a mixed strategy
whereas the police is not enforcing with certainty. We also postulate a short
period version of the repeated game with generalized stage game payoffs. For
this game, we construct a multistage strategy profile that is a Nash
equilibrium but not an SPE. Some solution candidates are excluded by showing
that they do not satisfy a one shot deviation property that is a necessary
condition for an SPE profile in a repeated game of perfect information.
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