DDQ: Collaborating Against Common DNS-Resolver-based Trackers.

As personal privacy breaches continue to happen, individuals are growing increasingly concerned about the privacy of their online browsing. DNS is an important Internet service that facilitates easy access to the web for individuals. However, the traffic generated by users performing DNS lookups may compromise privacy. For example, third-party DNS resolvers can track users to analyze their query traffic, extract their interests, and even determine their identity. Currently, there are only a few strategies to protect users from being tracked during DNS lookups. In this paper, we consider the problem of DNS resolvers tracking web browsing behavior and propose DDQ as a collaborative strategy to defend against common DNS-Resolver-based behavior trackers by diffusing DNS queries. We employ Bayes' theorem to demonstrate the extent to which the proposed strategy safeguards user privacy. Additionally, we analyze the delay during DNS lookups. Experimental results demonstrate that this strategy is effective in preventing DNS resolvers and malicious collaborators from recognizing the identity of the real sender of a DNS request. This contributes to an enhanced safeguarding of Internet users' privacy.