Lightweight Masking Against Static Power Side-Channel Attacks
CoRR(2024)
摘要
This paper presents a novel defense strategy against static power
side-channel attacks (PSCAs), a critical threat to cryptographic security. Our
method is based on (1) carefully tuning high-Vth versus low-Vth cell selection
during synthesis, accounting for both security and timing impact, and (2), at
runtime, randomly switching the operation between these cells. This approach
serves to significantly obscure static power patterns, which are at the heart
of static PSCAs. Our experimental results on a commercial 28nm node show a
drastic increase in the effort required for a successful attack, namely up to
96 times more traces. When compared to prior countermeasures, ours incurs
little cost, making it a lightweight defense.
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