Hardware Trojans in Quantum Circuits, Their Impacts, and Defense
CoRR(2024)
摘要
The reliability of the outcome of a quantum circuit in near-term noisy
quantum computers depends on the gate count and depth for a given problem.
Circuits with a short depth and lower gate count can yield the correct solution
more often than the variant with a higher gate count and depth. To work
successfully for Noisy Intermediate Scale Quantum (NISQ) computers, quantum
circuits need to be optimized efficiently using a compiler that decomposes
high-level gates to native gates of the hardware. Many 3rd party compilers are
being developed for lower compilation time, reduced circuit depth, and lower
gate count for large quantum circuits. Such compilers, or even a specific
release version of a compiler that is otherwise trustworthy, may be unreliable
and give rise to security risks such as insertion of a quantum trojan during
compilation that evades detection due to the lack of a golden/Oracle model in
quantum computing. Trojans may corrupt the functionality to give flipped
probabilities of basis states, or result in a lower probability of correct
basis states in the output. In this paper, we investigate and discuss the
impact of a single qubit Trojan (we have chosen a Hadamard gate and a NOT gate)
inserted one at a time at various locations in benchmark quantum circuits
without changing the the depth of the circuit. Results indicate an average of
16.18
For the NOT Trojan (with noise) there is 14.6
inputs. We then discuss the detection of such Trojans in a quantum circuit
using CNN-based classifier achieving an accuracy of 90
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