Individual and Collective Welfare in Risk Sharing with Many States

We provide a quantitative assessment of welfare in the classical model of risk-sharing and exchange under uncertainty. We prove three kinds of results. First, that in an equilibrium allocation, the scope for improving individual welfare by a given margin (an -improvement) vanishes as the number of states increases. Second, that the scope for a change in aggregate resources that may be distributed to enhance individual welfare by a given margin also vanishes. Equivalently: in an inefficient allocation, for a given level of resource sub-optimality (as measured by the coefficient of resource under-utilization), the possibilities for enhancing welfare by perturbing aggregate resources decrease exponentially to zero with the number of states. Finally, we consider efficient risk-sharing in standard models of uncertainty aversion with multiple priors, and show that, in an inefficient allocation, certain sets of priors shrink with the size of the state space.