Cooperation with dynamic asymmetric evaluation in complex networks from a risk perspective

The choice of strategy exposes individuals to the risk of betrayal. This induces individuals' irrational tendencies in strategy selection, which further influences the emergence of cooperative behavior. However, the underlying mechanisms connecting risk perception and the emergence of cooperation are still not fully understood. To address this, the classic evolutionary game model on complex networks is extended. We depict the interaction between strategy imitation and payoff evaluation from two perspectives: dynamic adjustment and irrational assessment. Specifically, the probability distortion involved in the dynamic selection of imitative reference points, as well as the asymmetric psychological utility associated with reference point dependence, is emphasized. Monte Carlo simulations demonstrate that individual irrational cognition induced by the risk of strategy selection can promote the emergence of cooperative behavior. Among them, the risk sensitivity within psychological utility has the most significant moderating effect. Moreover, the promoting effect of strong heterogeneity and high clustering in the network topology on cooperation under risk scenarios has been clarified. Additionally, the influence of initial states on the emergence of cooperation follows a step-like pattern. This research offers valuable insights for further exploring the cooperation mechanisms among irrational agents, even in scenarios involving the regulation of group cooperation behavior in risky situations.