Receiver-Oriented Cheap Talk Design
CoRR(2024)
摘要
This paper considers the dynamics of cheap talk interactions between a sender
and receiver, departing from conventional models by focusing on the receiver's
perspective. We study two models, one with transparent motives and another one
in which the receiver can filter the information that is accessible by
the sender. We give a geometric characterization of the best receiver
equilibrium under transparent motives and prove that the receiver does not
benefit from filtering information in this case. However, in general, we show
that the receiver can strictly benefit from filtering and provide efficient
algorithms for computing optimal equilibria. This innovative analysis aligns
with user-based platforms where receivers (users) control information
accessible to senders (sellers). Our findings provide insights into
communication dynamics, leveling the sender's inherent advantage, and offering
strategic interaction predictions.
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