TitanCFI: Toward Enforcing Control-Flow Integrity in the Root-of-Trust

Modern RISC-V platforms control and monitor security-critical systems such as industrial controllers and autonomous vehicles. While these platforms feature a Root-of-Trust (RoT) to store authentication secrets and enable secure boot technologies, they often lack Control-Flow Integrity (CFI) enforcement and are vulnerable to cyber-attacks which divert the control flow of an application to trigger malicious behaviours. Recent techniques to enforce CFI in RISC-V systems include ISA modifications or custom hardware IPs, all requiring ad-hoc binary toolchains or design of CFI primitives in hardware. This paper proposes TitanCFI, a novel approach to enforce CFI in the RoT. TitanCFI modifies the commit stage of the protected core to stream control flow instructions to the RoT and it integrates the CFI enforcement policy in the RoT firmware. Our approach enables maximum reuse of the hardware resource present in the System-on-Chip (SoC), and it avoids the design of custom IPs and the modification of the compilation toolchain, while exploiting the RoT tamper-proof storage and cryptographic accelerators to secure CFI metadata. We implemented the proposed architecture on a modern RISC-V SoC along with a return address protection policy in the RoT, and benchmarked area and runtime overhead. Experimental results show that TitanCFI achieves overhead comparable to SoA hardware CFI solutions for most benchmarks, with lower area overhead, resulting in 1