Competitive integrated airline schedule design and fleet assignment

Airline profits are significantly influenced by competitive timetables that match passenger demand to fleet resources. In this research, we develop an integrated, mixed-integer optimization model to derive a compre-hensive flight schedule, fleet assignment, and average airfares jointly. Passenger choice behavior is incorporated through a prospect theory-adjusted, nested, multinomial logit model which estimates market share. The competitive fleet assignment and schedule design (CFSD) formulation is embedded in a differentiated Bertrand game, such that each transport operator optimizes their best response function connected through the market share model. To solve the integrated optimization problem efficiently, a hybrid algorithm is developed that combines stabilized column generation with a large neighborhood search algorithm. The game-theoretic framework is applied to a case study in China involving legacy airlines, a low-cost carrier, and a high-speed rail (HSR) operator. The equilibrium outcomes suggest that the low-cost carrier is likely to stimulate demand and improve the level of service through secondary airports. The further development of high-speed rail service is expected to intensify competition among airlines and reduce the overall fare level. The low-cost carriers and HSR are able to significantly increase overall consumer surplus, providing insights into the potential for low-cost service in the Chinese aviation markets and the entrance of the public service obligation program at minimum cost.