Hinge Epistemology and Alethic Pluralism

AbstractI provide a reconstruction of a recent argument presented by Annalisa Coliva—the Alethic Challenge—that puts pressure her own version of propositional framework of hinge epistemology. Coliva has suggested that a way out from the Alethic Challenge is to hold that the truth of hinge propositions has a deflationary nature and that her hinge epistemology can adopt alethic pluralism for making sense of this suggestion. I assess the viability of this suggestion by arguing that the adoption of alethic pluralism on behalf of the propositional framework for hinge epistemology is hostage to two problems. The first problem is that of integrating a deflationary conception of truth in a pluralist alethic framework—the Integration Challenge. I also formulate a second problem: the problem of keeping distinct the truth property of hinges from the truth property of the other empirical propositions—the Alethic Leaching Problem.