An evolutionary game theory-based study examining the relationship between fiscal policy, stability of farmers' cooperatives, and environmentally friendly digital management

To increase the degree of implementation of the rural revitalization strategy, it is crucial to conduct a scientific investigation of the relationship between fiscal policy, fiscal decentralization, green digital management, and contract selection. This research develops an analytical framework for the application of fiscal policy and the choice of cooperative association contracts based on the contract theory. On the basis of a theoretical analysis of the external factors that influence the choice of residents' cooperative association contract and behavior, it goes on to investigate the interest game relationship and stability of three different cooperative associations (production type, service type, and industrial chain type). Additionally, it runs an empirical test using survey information from cooperative associations in China's Gansu Province. The findings indicate that the cooperative association is more likely to select the factor contract model depending on the strength of the fiscal policy support, the union's brand influence, and the regional market share change of the primary products. Evolutionary equilibrium is inhibited by the association's input costs, but a stable contract is created more favorably the more average the cost distribution is. The stability of the contract and its detrimental effects on pro-environmental behavior are worse the more damage other residents' breaches of the contract have caused. The research findings in this paper may serve as a basis for decision-making and a source of information for encouraging the high-quality growth of cooperative groups.