Resource Sharing in Energy Communities: A Cooperative Game Approach
CoRR(2023)
摘要
We analyze the overall benefits of an energy community cooperative game under
which distributed energy resources (DER) are shared behind a regulated
distribution utility meter under a general net energy metering (NEM) tariff.
Two community DER scheduling algorithms are examined. The first is a community
with centrally controlled DER, whereas the second is decentralized letting its
members schedule their own DER locally. For both communities, we prove that the
cooperative game's value function is superadditive, hence the grand coalition
achieves the highest welfare. We also prove the balancedness of the cooperative
game under the two DER scheduling algorithms, which means that there is a
welfare re-distribution scheme that de-incentivizes players from leaving the
grand coalition to form smaller ones. Lastly, we present five ex-post and an
ex-ante welfare re-distribution mechanisms and evaluate them in simulation, in
addition to investigating the performance of various community sizes under the
two DER scheduling algorithms.
更多查看译文
AI 理解论文
溯源树
样例
生成溯源树,研究论文发展脉络
Chat Paper
正在生成论文摘要