How does central-local interaction affect local environmental governance? Insights from the transformation of central environmental protection inspection in China

In recent years, one of the most important and innovative policy initiatives introduced by the Chinese government in the field of environmental protection and ecological civilization construction is the Central Environmental Protection Inspection (CEPI). CEPI is seen as a vital tool to encourage local implementation of environmental protection responsibility. Over the course of its operation (eight years), CEPI has transformed from the "campaign" phase to the "convention" phase. It is noted that while provincial governments face a common high-pressure environment created by CEPI, governance scenarios, behaviors, and performance vary across the country significantly. To better understand local governments' environmental governance behaviors under the transformation of CEPI, an integrated analysis framework consisting of two key elements, "central dominance" and "local proactiveness", is constructed based on the central-local interactions under the principalagent model. Based on this framework, we conducted a multi-case comparative analysis of four classic cases, with the following findings. (1) Along with the operation of CEPI and its transformation, the interaction between the central and local governments leads to four governance scenarios: "control-active cooperation", "control-passive cooperation", "guidance-active promotion", and "guidance-passive promotion". (2) Influenced by various factors such as pressure by the central government, local governments' capabilities and governance motivations, local governments form governance behaviors with varying degrees of proactiveness and autonomy. (3) After examining the governance performance of varying behaviors, it is found that local government's "active pro-motion" behavior can achieve higher governance effectiveness in the "convention" phase. Therefore, it is of policy implication that local governments should be guided to transit from "passive cooperation" to "active promotion". This paper has important guiding significance for understanding local environmental governance behaviors under strong top-down institutional pressure.