A study of licensing strategies for energy storage technologies in the renewable electricity supply chain under government subsidies

With the rapid spread of renewable electricity, the licensing of energy storage technology has become important way for technologically backward electricity suppliers to improve their competitiveness electricity market. However, there have been few studies that have investigated the influence of government policy on the selection of licensing strategies for energy storage technologies by renewable electricity suppliers. Consequently, we constructed a game model involving two competing renewable electricity suppliers, the company, and the government. One of them is a technologically advanced electricity supplier, and the is a technologically backward one. The model considers government subsidies and compares three licensing strategies: technology monopolies (TM), unit-production authorization (UA), and fixed-fee authorization Based on numerical analysis, this paper compares wholesale electricity prices, grid orders and grid government profits under different licensing strategies. Next, the choice of the optimal licensing strategy electricity suppliers and the preferences of the grid and the government for different licensing strategies analyzed. The results show that wholesale electricity prices increase and grid orders decrease under the strategy compared to the TM strategy, while the opposite is true under the FA strategy. The FA strategy preferred between electricity suppliers when the cost of generation from technologically advanced suppliers exceeds twice the cost of generation from technologically inferior suppliers. Otherwise, the UA strategy more appropriate. Moreover, the grid and government preferred the FA strategy to the TM or UA strategy, with profits rising 89% and 26% for the grid and government respectively under this strategy. Lastly, the is more profitable under the UA strategy than under the TM strategy only if the level of electricity reliability and grid cost are higher.