Effective Resource Allocation and Pricing Mechanism for MEC under Two-Price Equilibrium.

As an emerging technology, Mobile Edge Computing (MEC) can effectively address the problem of limited device resource supply. One of the important challenges for MEC is to design effective allocation and pricing mechanisms to improve buyer utility. Market equilibrium is another important goal, but Walrasian equilibrium and Conditional equilibrium only possible exist in non-strictly submodular valuation markets. Consequently, the RAP4MEC mechanism is proposed to allocate MEC resources and achieve two-price equilibrium (2PE) in the sub-additive valuation market. RAP4MEC ensures that each buyer is allocated at least one edge server and sets high and low prices to satisfy the 2PE. Moreover, theoretical analysis shows that RAP4MEC satisfies the properties of Incentive Compatibility, Individual Rationality, and Weak Budget Balance. The experimental results indicate that RAP4MEC performs better in terms of buyer utility and buyer satisfaction, and the approximation ratio of optimal social welfare is improved by 10.2% compared to the latest algorithm.