What pro-attitude for subjectivism about well-being?

Subjectivism as a view about well-being contends that an event contributes to an indivi-dual's well-being to the extent that this individual has or would have a certain pro -atti-tude towards this event under certain circumstances. To obtain a full-blown account of well-being, subjectivism must therefore specify several elements that are constitutive of the approach and, in particular, the relevant pro-attitude and circumstances. The present paper focuses on the relevant pro-attitude. It contends that this pro-attitude must satisfy three desiderata. It must provide a conception of well-being that could be extensionally adequate given a satisfactory determination of the relevant circumstances. It must offer a conception of well-being that applies equally well to infants, children, or adults. Finally, this relevant pro-attitude must exist. With these desiderata in hand, the paper shows that if subjectivism takes desire, or a cognitive attitude, or a more complex pro-attitude possi-bly understood in terms of desires, as relevant, then it cannot satisfy both the require-ments of extensional adequacy and invariability. These difficulties suggest that subjectivism should look for a different pro-attitude. I propose after others that a pro -attitude of valuing is a better candidate. However, my account of this pro-attitude of valuing is simpler than those that have been offered so far and I argue that only this simpler understanding of valuing satisfies the three desiderata initially presented.