Security boundaries of an optical-power limiter for protecting quantum-key-distribution systems

Unauthorized light injection has always been a vital threat to the practical security of a quantumkey-distribution (QKD) system. An optical-power limiter (OPL) based on the thermo-optical defocusing effect has been proposed and implemented, limiting the injected hacking light. As a hardware countermeasure, the performance of the OPL under various light-injection attacks will be tested to clarify the security boundary before it is widely deployed. To investigate the security boundary of the OPL in quantum cryptography, we comprehensively test and analyze the behavior of the OPL under continuous-wave (cw) light-injection attacks and pulse-illumination attacks with pulse repetition rates of 0.5 Hz, 40 MHz, and 1 GHz. The test results illuminate the security boundary of the OPL, which allows one to properly employ the OPL in use cases. The methodology of testing and analysis proposed here is applicable to other power-limitation components in a QKD system.