Whether tough environmental regulatory measures can play a dominant role? Evidence from private enterprises in China (vol 8, pg 14568, 2022)

Based on the two-tier stochastic frontier analysis method, this paper constructs a basic model to analyze the environmental treatment investment of enterprises, and discusses the influence of the gambling power between enterprises and governments on the input of environmental pollution control. The data in this paper are from the Chinese Private Enterprise Survey (CPES). And empirical results show that the gambling power between enterprises and government affects the investment of pollution control to a great extent. The influence proportion of the gambling power of the enterprise on the investment of environmental pollution control is 84.44%, which is much higher than that of the government (15.56%). The enterprise is the executor with more real information, and can even reduce the investment of pollution control by concealing its actual situation and so on, hence the enterprise occupies the initiative in the game process. Although enterprises are still in the dominant position in the game, their advantages are continually shrinking. With the expansion of the scale of the enterprise and the high level of entrepreneur education, the game advantage of the enterprise is continuously decreasing.