The Investment Management Game: Extending the Scope of the Notion of Core
arxiv(2023)
Abstract
The core is a dominant solution concept in economics and game theory. In this context, the following question arises, ``How versatile is this solution concept?'' We note that within game theory, this notion has been used for profit -- equivalently, cost or utility -- sharing only. In this paper, we show a completely different use for it: in an {\em investment management game}, under which an agent needs to allocate her money among investment firms in such a way that {\em in each of exponentially many future scenarios}, sufficient money is available in the ``right'' firms so she can buy an ``optimal investment'' for that scenario. We study a restriction of this game to {\em perfect graphs} and characterize its core. Our characterization is analogous to Shapley and Shubik's characterization of the core of the assignment game. The difference is the following: whereas their characterization follows from {\em total unimodularity}, ours follows from {\em total dual integrality}. The latter is another novelty of our work.
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