C2C: Fine-grained Configuration-driven System Call Filtering

ABSTRACTConfiguration options allow users to customize application features according to the desired requirements. While the code that corresponds to disabled features is never executed, it still resides in process memory and comprises part of the application's attack surface, e.g., it can be reused for the construction of exploit code. Automatically reducing the attack surface of disabled application features according to a given configuration is thus a desirable defense-in-depth capability. The intricacies of modern software design and the complexities of popular programming languages, however, introduce significant challenges in automatically deriving the mapping of configuration options to their corresponding application code. In this paper, we present Configuration-to-Code (C2C), a generic configuration-driven attack surface reduction technique that automatically maps configuration options to application code using static code analysis and instrumentation. C2C operates at a fine-grained level by pruning configuration-dependent conditional branches in the control flow graph, allowing the precise identification of a given configuration option's code at the basic block level. At runtime, C2C reduces the application's attack surface by filtering any system calls required exclusively by disabled features. Using popular applications, we show how security-critical system calls (such as execve) can be automatically disabled when not needed, limiting an attacker's vulnerability exploitation capabilities. System call filtering also reduces the exposed attack surface of the underlying Linux kernel, neutralizing 32 additional CVEs (for a total of 88) compared to previous software specialization techniques.