Aberrant memory and delusional ideation: A pernicious partnership?

Delusions can be conceptualized as beliefs that are both at odds with consensus reality and espoused with high conviction. While delusions represent a cardinal symptom of schizophrenia, delusion-like beliefs can be found in the general population. Do similar cognitive mechanisms support delusionality across this spectrum? If so, what are they? Here, we examine evidence for a mechanistic role of the (associative) memory system in the formation and maintenance of delusions and delusion-like beliefs. While general neurocognitive metrics do not tend to associate with delusionality, our scoping review of the clinical and subclinical literature reveals several sub -domains of memory function that do. These include a propensity to commit errors of commission (i.e., false alarms and intrusions), source memory biases, and metamemory impairment. We discuss how several of these effects may stem from aberrant associative memory function and offer recommendations for future research. Further, we propose a state/trait interaction model in which underlying traits (i.e., impaired associative and metamemory function) may become coupled with delusionality during states of acute psychosis, when memory function is particularly challenged by aberrant salience attribution and noisy perceptual input. According to this model, delusions may arise as explanations to high-salience (but low-source) mnemonic content that is endorsed with high confidence.