Waste battery-to-reutilization decisions under government subsidies: An evolutionary game approach

Recycling waste batteries for remanufacturing or echelon utilization is conducive to energy storage and the electric vehicle market. To address the distinct difficulties in the process of waste battery-to-reutilization, we build an evolutionary game to model three parties that include the government, manufacturing, and consumers. We find that the choice of strategies for government support, echelon utilization, and consumer participation is an equilibrium. Moreover, we simulate waste batteries-to-reutilization under the subsidy reduction scenario. Our findings demonstrate that: (1) the profits of manufacturers and consumers increase significantly in the first year of subsidies granted by the government; (2) a reduction in subsidies initiates various profit trends across the strategies of echelon utilization and remanufacturing. Generally, the profits earned through echelon utilization are higher than those through remanufacturing during the period of subsidy reduction; and (3) after the subsidies fall to zero, the earnings of manufacturers and consumers increase in the long run. Our paper proposes gener-alizing the typical mechanism of recycling subsidies for cities and formulating a reasonable path for reducing subsidies. Manufacturers should pay more attention to echelon utilization for the two decision-making schemes of echelon utilization and remanufacturing.