Is Self-Related Cognition Resistant to Time-Based Expectancy?

Individuals adapt to their environments by scheduling cognitive processing capacities selectively to the points in time where they are most likely required. This effect is known as time-based expectancy (TBE) and has been demonstrated for several cognitive capacities, like perceptual attention, task set activation, or response preparation. However, it has been argued that self-related cognition (i.e., processing of information linked to oneself) is universally prioritized, compared to non-self-related information in the cognitive system. Consequently, self-related cognition should be resistant to tem-poral scheduling by TBE, because individuals maintain a constantly high expectancy for self-related cognition, irrespective of its temporal likeliness. We tested this hypothesis in a task-switching para-digm where participants randomly switched between a self-related task and a neutral task. The tasks were preceded by a short or a long warning interval in each trial, and the interval duration predicted probabilistically the task type. We found that participants showed TBE for the neutral task but not for the self-related task. We conclude that the individual cannot benefit from time-based task expec-tancy when the to-be-expected task is constantly activated, due to its self-related nature.