Desirable Rankings
Proceedings of the 23rd ACM Conference on Economics and Computation(2022)
Abstract
We consider the problem of aggregating individual preferences over alternatives into a social ranking. A key feature of the problems that we consider---and the one that allows us to obtain positive results, in contrast to negative results such as Arrow's Impossibililty Theorem---is that the alternatives to be ranked are outcomes of a competitive process. Examples include rankings of colleges or academic journals. The foundation of our ranking method is that alternatives that an agent desires---those that they have been rejected by---should be ranked higher than the one they receive. We provide a mechanism to produce a social ranking given any preference profile and outcome assignment, and characterize this ranking as the unique one that satisfies certain desirable axioms.
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