Knowing how in japanese

Epistemology or theory of knowledge occupies a special place in the traditions of philosophy, and not surprisingly, our talk of knowledge has been a recurring theme in epistemology over many centuries. One contemporary instantiation of the theme is the topic of ascribing knowledge-how. Roughly put, there are two competing views of the nature of knowledge-how. On the one hand, according to ‘intellectualism’ about knowledge-how, knowledge-how is a species of knowledge-that, and possessing knowledge-how (such as knowing how to swim) amounts to standing in a certain relation to some proposition (Stanley and Williamson 2001, Stanley 2011a, Pavese 2015, among others). On the other hand, ‘antiintellectualism’ denies that knowledge-how is a species of knowledge-that, claiming that there is some element in knowledge-how—which is characterized in various ways using notions related to ‘capacity’ and ‘ability’—that is irreducible to the possession of propositional knowledge (Ryle 1946, 1949; Markie 2015; Habgoot-Coote, 2018 among others). What is interesting about the philosophical debate on the nature of knowledge from a linguistic perspective is that a major argument for intellectualism is based on the semantic considerations of the structure know how to V, a control construction.