Public-Private Collaborations In Emergency Logistics: A Framework Based On Logistical And Game-Theoretical Concepts

Collaboration in emergency logistics can be beneficial for governmental actors when supply chains need to be set up immediately. In comparison to research on humanitarian-business partnerships, the body of literature on so-called Public-Private Emergency Collaborations (PPEC) remains scarce. Private companies are only rarely considered within research on emergency collaborations, although they serve as an important chain in the efficient supply of goods given their resources and existing communication networks. Based on this research gap, we contribute to the research field by quantitatively evaluating public-private collaboration in emergency logistics. A framework for public-private emergency collaborations is developed based on logistical and game-theoretical concepts. In addition, we characterize both public and private actors' possible roles in emergency logistics based on literature research and real cases. Furthermore, we provide a structured overview on existing PPECs and the challenges they are confronted with. The game-theoretic PPEC model created in this paper provides more detailed information into the motivation and incentives of the partners involved in emergency collaborations. Inspired by game-theoretic accounts of conventional public-private partnerships, this model sheds light on the partners' participation constraints (which define the scope of collaboration), the effects on the outcome if the partners' contributions are strategic substitutes, and on reputational effects. Finally, we illustrate how a mechanism design approach can be used by the state to transform the firm's incentives into lower levels of undersupply or deprivation.