Evolutionary Game Analysis On The Recycling Strategy Of Household Medical Device Enterprises Under Government Dynamic Rewards And Punishments

Under the background of the aging population and the improvement of people's quality of life, the demand for household medical devices is expanding, which has huge market potential. However, the recycling of waste household medical devices has become a problem that must be faced by the market expansion. In order to reduce the environmental pollution caused by abandoned household medical devices, based on the dynamic punishment and dynamic subsidy measures adopted by the government, the evolutionary game model between the government and the household medical device enterprises is constructed. The strategic choice of the government and the domestic medical equipment enterprises is studied from the perspective of system dynamics. It is found that when the government adopts static measures, there is no stable equilibrium point in the game between the government and enterprises, while when the government adopts dynamic punishment or subsidies, there is a stable equilibrium point in the evolutionary game. In addition, the government can increase the penalty or reduce the subsidy to promote the probability of household medical device enterprises to choose recycling strategy and reduce environmental pollution.