Green Product Design And Pricing Decisions In A Risk-Averse Supply Chain Under Alternative Power Structures

Motivated by the prevailing green product design and the different supply chain power structures, this paper aims to analyse the role of power relationship and risk-aversion in economic and environmental performance of sustainable supply chain. Three game theory models, including the manufacturer Stackelberg (MS) model, retailer Stackelberg (RS) model, and vertical Nash (VN model, are developed to study the pricing and greenness level decisions in a two-echelon sustainable supply chain, where one risk-averse manufacturer sells green products through one risk-averse retailer. This paper shows that when selling through a more risk-averse retailer, the risk-averse manufacturer prefers to provide a product with a higher level of greenness and achieve a greater utility regardless of the power structure. A manufacturer as a follower may have stronger motivation to increase the product's level of greenness than one in a more balanced supply chain when the green technology investment coefficient is sufficiently low. With regard to the power structure, the channel leadership is not necessary to for the manufacturer to achieve higher utility, which depends on the green technology investment coefficient, greenness level sensitivity, and players' risk aversion.