Safe Functional Systems Through Integrity Types And Verified Assembly

Building a trustworthy life-critical embedded system requires deep reasoning about the potential effects that sequences of machine instructions can have on full system operation. Rather than trying to analyze complete binaries and the countless ways their instructions can interact with one another - memory, side effects, control registers, implicit state, etc. - we explore a new approach. We propose an architecture controlled by a thin computational layer designed to tightly correspond with the lambda calculus, drawing on principles of functional programming to bring the assembly much closer to myriad reasoning frameworks, such as the Coq proof assistant. This approach allows assembly level verified versions of critical code to operate safely in tandem with arbitrary code, including imperative and unverified system components, without the need for large supporting trusted computing bases. We demonstrate that this computational layer can be built in such a way as to simultaneously provide full programmability and compact, precise, and complete semantics, while still using hardware resources comparable to normal embedded systems. To demonstrate the practicality of this approach, our FPGA-implemented prototype runs an embedded medical application which monitors and treats life-threatening arrhythmias. Though the system integrates untrusted and imperative components, our architecture allows for the formal verification of multiple properties of the end-to-end system. We present a proof of correctness of the assembly-level implementation of the core algorithm in Coq, the integrity of trusted data via a noninterference proof, and a guarantee that our prototype meets critical timing requirements. (C) 2020 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V.