Replication data for: Hospital Choices, Hospital Prices, and Financial Incentives to Physicians
user-5ebe3bbdd0b15254d6c50b2c(2019)
Abstract
View help for Summary We estimate an insurer-specific preference function which rationalizes hospital referrals for privately insured births in California. The function is additively separable in: a hospital price paid by the insurer, the distance traveled, and plan-and severity-specific hospital fixed effects (capturing hospital quality). We use an inequality estimator that allows for errors in price and detailed hospital-severity interactions and obtain markedly different results than those from a logit. The estimates indicate that insurers with more capitated physicians are more responsive to price. Capitated plans send patients further to utilize similar quality, lower-priced hospitals; but the cost-quality trade-off does not vary with capitation rates.(JEL G22, H51, I11, I13, I18, J44)
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Key words
hospital prices,physicians,financial incentives
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