Using Evolutionary Game Theory to Study Behavioral Strategies of the Government and Carriers Under Different Transshipment Modes

Due to severe congestion before the Three Gorges Dam, roll-on/roll-off and container carriers are encouraged to adopt water-land transshipment mode. Owing to high transit and road costs, however, carriers are reluctant to adopt this mode. In this paper, we study the spatial-temporal relationship between the transshipment mode and the transshipment cost. Furthermore, we analyze the feasibility of subsidy strategies with regards to water-land transshipment from the standpoint of the government. An evolutionary game theory model is used to identify the equilibrium points of transshipment and non-transshipment, as well as subsidy and non-subsidy strategies available to carriers and the government, respectively, under different scenarios. With a transshipment job for a major carrier as an example, freight prices offered by carriers and subsidies provided by the government under water-road and water-road-water modes are analyzed, with the aim of providing strategic input for both the government and the carriers.