The Failure of America’s Transferal Policy from the Cold War to the War on Terror

The Failure of America’s Transferal Policy from the Cold War to the War on Terror Jason Cooley Introduction When a nation is attempting to become a potent force in the world, its leaders have a propensity to focus on the positives that will surface once this goal is achieved. What they fail to take into consideration is the manner in which several problems also emerge after a considerable amount of power is acquired. Some of these issues can be resolved rather quickly, but others take a lot of time to rectify because they are extremely complicated. One of the problems that take up much of the time of policymakers from a world power is instability within nations where military interventions are taking place. If instances from the past are examined, it becomes quite apparent that one of the ways that a major power deals with disorder is by using transferal, a policy that consists of handing security responsibilities from the intervening soldiers to indigenous parties. While the Cold War was in progress, American officials exhibited an affinity for the transferal policy. It can be said that this fondness did not dissipate following the downfall of the Soviet Union because Washington has continued to make transfers in the campaign against Islamic extremist organizations. Within this article, the reader will have an opportunity to see how it would be advantageous for the United States to move away from this approach since poor transfers in Vietnam and Afghanistan will be subjected to analysis. We will begin with the case from the Cold War. Full Text: PDF DOI: 10.15640/jirfp.v7n1a1