Multi-Channel Jamming Attacks Against Cooperative Defense: A Two-Level Stackelberg Game Approach

In this paper, a network consisting of a source-destination pair and multiple relays in the presence of a smart jammer who can launch multi-channel jamming attacks is considered, where the direct link between the source and destination does not exist. A game-theoretic framework is proposed to analyze the conflict between the jammer and the legitimate nodes, i.e., the source and the relays, and the cooperation among the legitimate nodes. Specifically, a two-level Stackelberg game is formulated, where the jammer as a leader combats against the legitimate nodes by allocating the jamming powers at the upper level, and the relays as leaders cooperate with the source by selling forwarding powers at the lower level after observing the strategy of the jammer. The Stackelberg equilibrium of the proposed game is derived and analyzed. An algorithm is further designed to obtain the optimal jamming power allocation. Numerical results are provided to verify the theoretical analysis and show the effectiveness of the proposed algorithm.