A Game-Theoretic Approach On Resource Allocation With Colluding Nodes In Manets

Prevalent concerns with dynamic networks typically involve security. Especially with resource constraints in dynamic networks such as mobile ad-hoc networks (MANETs), security needs to be of particular consideration. In this paper, we first analyze the solution concept involved in optimizing resource allocation and data packet forwarding. In a MANET, the availability of having data packets forwarded may be insubstantial due to the presence of selfish nodes. Nodes may not want to participate in the network to preserve their own resources. We propose a packet-forwarding problem model with a negotiation game, where an arbitrator acts as a cluster head and initiates a bargaining game. Thereafter, we consider the possibility of having some group of nodes exhibit malicious behavior and collude to subvert the MANET. We investigate the problem by finding the optimal Nash Equilibrium (NE) strategies of the negotiation game. Then, we simulate the effect of the coalition of malicious nodes in a mobile environment. Simulation results support our model.