A Complete Key Recovery Timing Attack On A Gpu
PROCEEDINGS OF THE 2016 IEEE INTERNATIONAL SYMPOSIUM ON HIGH-PERFORMANCE COMPUTER ARCHITECTURE (HPCA-22)(2016)
摘要
Graphics Processing Units (GPUs) have become mainstream parallel computing devices. They are deployed on diverse platforms, and an increasing number of applications have been moved to GPUs to exploit their massive parallel computational resources. GPUs are starting to be used for security services, where highvolume data is encrypted to ensure integrity and confidentiality. However, the security of GPUs has only begun to receive attention. Issues such as side-channel vulnerability have not been addressed.The goal of this paper is to evaluate the side-channel security of GPUs and demonstrate a complete AES (Advanced Encryption Standard) key recovery using known ciphertext through a timing channel. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first work that clearly demonstrates the vulnerability of a commercial GPU architecture to side-channel timing attacks. Specifically, for AES-128, we have been able to recover all key bytes utilizing a timing side channel in under 30 minutes.
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关键词
key-recovery timing channel attack,graphics processing units,parallel computing devices,massive-parallel computational resources,high-volume data encryption,data integrity,data confidentiality,GPU security,AES key recovery,Advanced Encryption Standard,ciphertext,GPU architecture vulnerability,side-channel timing attack vulnerability,AES-128
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