Professional Skepticism: The Effects Of A Partner'S Influence And The Level Of Fraud Indicators On Auditors' Fraud Judgments And Actions

The Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB), in its recent auditor inspections, cited a lack of professional skepticism and selection of appropriate audit procedures as serious problems for auditors, and suggested that the tone set by audit partners is critical for auditors' fraud investigations. We investigate selected components of Nelson's (2009) model of professional skepticism: the effects of the partner's emphasis on professional skepticism and the effect of the level of fraud indicators on auditors' identification of fraud risk factors, auditors' fraud risk assessments, and their selection of audit procedures. Thus, we provide an initial test of predictions of the links established in his model, and our results suggest a possible extension to his model. This study provides evidence that a partner's emphasis on professional skepticism is critical for both effective and efficient identification of relevant fraud risk factors and choice of relevant audit procedures. These results should be informative to both standard setters and academic researchers because they highlight the costs and benefits of an audit partner's attitude toward professional skepticism on the evaluation of fraud.