The Exact PRF-Security of NMAC and HMAC.
ADVANCES IN CRYPTOLOGY - CRYPTO 2014, PT I(2014)
摘要
NMAC is amode of operation which turns a fixed input-length keyed hash function f into a variable input-length function. A practical single-key variant of NMAC called HMAC is a very popular and widely deployed message authentication code (MAC). Security proofs and attacks for NMAC can typically be lifted to HMAC. NMAC was introduced by Bellare, Canetti and Krawczyk [Crypto'96], who proved it to be a secure pseudorandom function (PRF), and thus also a MAC, assuming that (1) f is a PRF and (2) the function we get when cascading f is weakly collision-resistant. Unfortunately, HMAC is typically instantiated with cryptographic hash functions like MD5 or SHA-1 for which (2) has been found to be wrong. To restore the provable guarantees for NMAC, Bellare [Crypto'06] showed its security based solely on the assumption that f is a PRF, albeit via a non-uniform reduction. - Our first contribution is a simpler and uniform proof for this fact: If f is an e-secure PRF (against q queries) and a delta-non-adaptively secure PRF (against q queries), then NMAC f is an (epsilon + lq delta)-secure PRF against q queries of length at most l blocks each. - We then show that this epsilon + lq delta bound is basically tight. For the most interesting case where lq delta >= epsilon we prove this by constructing an f for which an attack with advantage lq delta exists. This also violates the bound O(l epsilon) on the PRF-security of NMAC recently claimed by Koblitz and Menezes. - Finally, we analyze the PRF-security of a modification of NMAC called NI [An and Bellare, Crypto'99] that differs mainly by using a compression function with an additional keying input. This avoids the constant rekeying on multi-block messages in NMAC and allows for a security proof starting by the standard switch from a PRF to a random function, followed by an information-theoretic analysis. We carry out such an analysis, obtaining a tight lq(2)/2(c) bound for this step, improving over the trivial bound of l(2) q(2)/2(c). The proof borrows combinatorial techniques originally developed for proving the security of CBC-MAC [Bellare et al., Crypto'05].
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关键词
Message authentication codes,pseudorandom functions,NMAC,HMAC,NI
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