To Transmit or Not to Transmit? Distributed Queueing Games in Infrastructureless Wireless Networks

We study distributed queueing games in interference-limited wireless networks. We formulate the throughput maximization problem via distributed selection of users' transmission thresholds as a Nash Equilibrium Problem (NEP). We first focus on the solution analysis of the NEP and derive sufficient conditions for the existence and uniqueness of a Nash Equilibrium (NE). Then, we develop a general best-response-based algorithmic framework wherein the users can explicitly choose the degree of desired cooperation and signaling, converging to different types of solutions, namely: 1) a NE of the NEP when there is no cooperation among users and 2) a stationary point of the Network Utility Maximization (NUM) problem associated with the NEP, when some cooperation among the users in the form of (pricing) message passing is allowed. Finally, as a benchmark, we design a globally optimal but centralized solution method for the nonconvex NUM problem. Our experiments show that in many scenarios the sum-throughput at the NE of the NEP is very close to the global optimum of the NUM problem, which validates our noncooperative and distributed approach. When the gap of the NE from the global optimality is non negligible (e.g., in the presence of “high” coupling among users), exploiting cooperation among the users in the form of pricing enhances the system performance.