Deterrence, technology, and the sensible distribution of arms control verification resources
NAVAL RESEARCH LOGISTICS(2011)
摘要
For routine inspections in the frame of arms control, we address the determination of a rational basis for the distribution of available verification resources among controlled States. The analysis is performed primarily in the context of the nonproliferation treaty. In the spirit of this treaty, which in its original conception stressed objectivity, we adopt a formal, quantified point of view applying the theory of n-person noncooperative games. Emphasis is placed on the conditions necessary for fulfillment of the fundamental verification objective of deterring illegal behavior, and reasonable and intuitively understandable conclusions are derived. (C) 2009 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 58: 296-304, 2011
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关键词
game theory,inspection games,nonproliferation treaty,critical times
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