JOGOS COLONIAIS: MUDANÇA INSTITUCIONAL E DESEMPENHO ECONÔMICO, O CASO DA DIVERSIFICAÇÃO AGRÍCOLA NO RIO DE JANEIRO - 1750-1800

This paper aims to analyze the incentives to the agricultural diversification in the Marquês de Pombal administration, and its influence on the economic performance of colonial economy of the state of Rio de Janeiro in the period of 1750 to 1800. Using the New Institutional Economy as a theoretical approach, and the game theory as an analytical tool, this work deals with the cultures of indigo and rice, the two products that had better performances in response to the incentives. It shows how the change in the informal rules determined the change of the formal rules that made possible the better economic performance. The analysis of the results of the institucional change was made by modelling the interaction between the portuguese Crown and the farmers as a sequential game of incomplete information. The results show that the initial success of the culture of indigo, and its posterior decline, and the success of the culture of rice can be understood as an equilibrium solution.