Channeling frustrations: Institutions, economic fluctuations, and political behavior

While the literature suggests that clear lines ofresponsibility lead to greaterincumbent dependence on economic conditions forsupport, little has been said abouthow electorates channel frustrations in systemscharacterized by `fuzzy' lines ofresponsibility, i.e., the shape and status ofparliamentary government in relation topossible choice of electors open to them. The argumentpresented here is that fuzzylines of responsibility result in lower incentives toparticipate in political processesand greater system dissatisfaction given economiccircumstances. This decline isgreater in systems in which incumbent responsibilityis less easily identified by theindividual citizen.To test this, data are collected from eight Europeannations over the period 1975–1992.Split sample and slope intervention models withrobust estimation areemployed at the individual level. System levelaggregates are analyzed using pooledtime-series analysis to confirm individual levelfindings. Finally, election turnoutdata are also analyzed to obtain election levelverification of survey findings.Evidence suggests that participation is more heavilyinfluenced by economicconditions in fuzzy settings. Coupled with existingliterature, this suggests that whileclear settings encourage punishment of the incumbentunclear settings tend to causeindividuals to become more withdrawn and alienated.However, economic conditionsare also important to overall system effects. Thefindings herein suggest that unclearor fuzzy settings increase the role of economicconditions in determination of systemaffect.