Action Theory and the Problem of Motivation

A phenomenology of human action examines how agents apply knowledge of values to the realization of goods. Scheler’s efforts guide us here. Scheler first criticizes Kant’s concept of action for its too-narrow focus upon the will and for a false intellectualism that is rooted in Enlightenment psychology. Action, for Scheler, begins with conation and its differentiations; it is fundamental to the formation of purposes and ultimately to the performance of an action. The person, his Ordo amoris, his basic moral tenor, his intentions, and his will all condition the moral value of an action that is “teleological” in nature, i.e., intends to realize values. Goodness consists in a person’s efforts to realize values. Scheler insists that what is willed is the action, not its eventual outcome. Its moral value is imminent to it, and is not derived from its outcome. We apply this phenomenology an imaginary case in which an agent attempts to realize values, and then return to the theme of moral freedom, specifically to the question of whether knowledge of the values realizable in some situation determines the will to act.